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ABSTRACT

Questionnaires are often used as measures of inner experience. This study questions the
adequacy of such measures, using inner speech as an example. We compared two questionnaire
measures of inner speaking to each other and to inner experience as apprehended by Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES, a naturalistic, high fidelity method of exploring inner experience).
Undergraduate volunteers (N = 260) took two questionnaires designed to measure inner
speaking: the Self-Talk Scale (STS) and the Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ). A
subset of these (N = 16) participated in DES to investigate their inner speaking with fidelity.
Scores on the NIEQ and STS were strongly correlated. However, the correlations between either
questionnaire and DES-apprehended inner speaking were near zero—questionnaire ratings of
inner speaking grossly overestimated the frequency of inner speaking as found by DES. These
results suggest that questionnaire responses may be based more on presuppositions about
experience than on actually occurring experience, and suggest caution in using questionnaires to
study inner experience.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO INNER SPEAKING
Inner speaking is talking to yourself in your head, in words, silently. If asked “How
frequently do you innerly speak?” some would confidently reply that they speak to themselves
constantly. Others would say that they rarely or never innerly speak. Are such responses likely to
be correct? What might be the characteristics of the inner experience of those who say they
innerly speak frequently? Of those who say they innerly speak rarely?
The answer to “how frequently do you innerly speak” may be based not on a person’s
actual frequency of inner speaking but rather on a set of implicit and perhaps unacknowledged
assumptions of inner experience (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013). Self-perceived frequency
could be based on one or a few particular incidents that easily come to mind or occurred recently.
Inaccuracy of frequency estimation might arise because the difficulty of remembering and
categorizing events as numerous and transient as inner experiences.
This study seeks to apprehend and describe in high fidelity the inner experience of a
sample of those who rate themselves high on a questionnaire measure of inner speaking, and of
another sample who rate themselves low on the same measure. Using an ecologically valid way
of discovering some basic characteristics of inner experience including inner speaking, we
expect to shed light on the extent to which such questionnaire reports should be trusted. Nisbett
and Wilson (1977), Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007), and Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) suggest
that this extent might be small.
This thesis has four sections. First, it provides historical perspectives and review of
research in inner speaking, including research using questionnaires. Second, it provides a critical
1

review of modern methods of experience sampling. Third, the procedure and methods used to
investigate the research question are described. Finally the results and implications of the
findings are discussed.
Background and characteristics of the phenomenon
Inner speaking, also known as inner speech, self-talk, inner monologue, subvocal speech,
internal dialogue and self-statements (Morin, 2005), can be briefly defined as innerly speaking in
a silent voice that could not be heard by an external observer, unaccompanied by observable
muscular activity (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013). Inner speaking as a subject of study was
not, for many years, considered a legitimate target of research. Behaviorism viewed any selfreport of an inner experience as fundamentally unreliable, inaccessible, and unacceptable to
psychological science. Skinner summed up this view of psychology: “In a given episode, the
environment acts upon the organism, something happens inside, the organism then acts upon the
environment. The first, third and fourth of these events is the field of the science of
behavior…what happens inside is another part of the story” (Skinner, 1986).
As the influence of behaviorism waned and the “cognitive revolution” took hold, inner
speaking as well as other so-called mental processes have again become targets of study.
Currently, inner speaking has assumed a place of importance in psychology in general and
clinical psychology in particular. Cognitive behavioral therapies often specifically target the
inner speaking of those suffering from disorders (Ellis, 1976; Ishikawa et al., 2012). Inner
speaking is thought to play a part in depression, social anxiety, and many other disorders
including the auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia (Sanz & Avia, 1994; Allen, Aleman, &
McGuire, 2007). Aside from psychopathology, inner speaking has been implicated in impulse
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control and self-regulation of behavior (Morin, 1993), regulation of behavior in social situations
(San Martín Martínez, Boada i Calbet, & Feigenbaum, 2011) and self-awareness (Morin, 2005).
Notwithstanding its importance, inner speaking remains an under-researched topic
(Morin, 2009).
Inner speaking as a phenomenon has been observed by philosophers and their
psychologist successors at least from the time of Plato (Chiesa, 1991). French psychologists
Egger (1881) and Ballet (1886) were the first to apply scientific methods of their day to the study
of the characteristics of inner speaking. Egger, through observing himself, thought that inner
speaking always accompanied his thinking. In his own words “At any moment, the soul speaks
his thoughts internally” (Egger, 1881, p.1). Ballet (1886) agreed with Egger on this point and
adds that inner speaking is an essential part of the act of reading. He thought that whenever
words are read, we innerly spoke the words as a part of the reading process. Although Egger and
Ballet were in agreement, the use of introspective techniques by other researchers in later studies
would lead to conflicting theories, as investigators described their own inner speaking and
arrived at different conclusions (Sokolov, 1971).
One of the early writers on the topic of inner speaking was Lev Vygotsky. His nearlycentury-old writings on inner speaking continue to influence research in the present day (e.g.,
Jones, 2009; San Martín Martínez, Boada i Calbet, & Feigenbaum, 2011; McCarthy-Jones &
Fernyhough, 2011). Vygotsky saw inner speaking as being part of the natural progression of
learning language (Vygotsky, 1934. According to Vygotsky, language is necessarily an
expressive act involving a dialogue between two people. Children first learn to speak expressing
themselves to others and then learn to speak to themselves out loud (egocentric speech). Inner
3

speaking is the subsequent internalization of egocentric speech. Vygotsky did not see inner
speaking as simply speech minus the sound but as a unique phenomenon possessing its own
characteristics. First, because of its “dialogic” origins, inner speaking reflects a conversation
with the self; as a result, the presence of other voices in the inner speaking is to be expected.
Second, Vygotsky described inner speaking as possessing the characteristics of “predication,”
the speaking of a predicate without speaking the subject, which would be redundant because the
subject is (obviously) known to the inner speaker and implied by the predicate. For example, the
speaker may innerly speak “bad” while meaning “the food is bad.” The subject (food) is absent
in the inner speech, but is understood as present by the inner speaker. He viewed this
condensation of inner speaking as an essential part of the “syntax” of inner speaking. Third,
Vygotsky considered word “sense” (the sum of all our experiences with the word) to take
precedence over word “meaning” (its simple definition) in inner speaking. These word senses
also freely flow into each other and influenced one another, even combining to form new senses
in a process he called “agglutination” (Vygotsky, 1986; Ehrich, 2006).
Jean Piaget proposed a different theory for the origin of inner speaking. When children
initially acquire speech, it tends to be egocentric only (addressed to the speaker). As children
mature, they become more aware of others and engage in social speech, thus losing speech’s
egocentricity. As they develop and become socially aware of others, they eventually learn to
keep silent the thoughts that previously would have been verbalized. These internalized
egocentric thoughts become inner speaking (Oates, Wood, & Grayson, 2005, Frawley 1997)
Whereas Piaget’s theory proposed that egocentric speech is the first step in developing social
speech, and that inner speaking is an internalized holdover from an earlier developmental period,
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Vygotsky held that egocentric speech developed secondarily from social speech, retained its
characteristic of a two person conversation (dialogicity), and represented a unique phenomenon.
Many have theorized about the particular characteristics of inner speaking. Whereas
Vygotsky thought that it was dialogic, Frawley (1997) held that inner speaking, as “the language
for thought, gives the appearance of communication, but in fact is more like pure broadcasting
than the conveyance of information” (Frawley,1997, p.178). Descriptive Experience Sampling
(DES) investigations into inner experience have described characteristics of inner speaking. In
the typical inner speaking experience, people apprehend themselves to be speaking normally, in
their natural voice, without the production of external sound. The speaking is usually (but not
always) in complete sentences, in contrast to Vygotsky’s claim of nearly constant predication
(Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, 2013). Like external speaking, inner speaking can carry the full
range of emotion and communicative nuance. Inner speaking can be inflected to express
happiness, excitement, anger, annoyance, etc. Inner speaking can be addressed to another person,
but it has also been observed to be spoken to nobody in particular, similar to what was noted by
Frawley (1997). Furthermore, inner speaking is distinguished from “inner hearing” as being an
experience of active production, rather than a passive, receptive experience (Heavey & Hurlburt,
2008; Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, 2013).
DES has found that inner speaking is not a uniform phenomenon. There exist significant
variations in experiences that can be called “inner speaking.” Inner speaking can be experienced
(although not necessarily so) as originating from a particular part of the body such as the head or
the chest. Multiple inner speakings expressing simultaneous but disparate content can occur
(although not frequently), and that simultaneity can be with other inner speakings or with
speaking aloud. Inner speaking has also been observed to be “partially worded” or having only a
5

portion of the words present but flowing in an unimpeded way (Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey,
2013). This is similar to the “predication” described by Vygotsky (1986); however DES
frequently finds any word in a sentence can be missing, not only subjects. Furthermore,
“unworded speaking” has been observed by DES, where people experience themselves as
speaking but where no words are present.
There are widely different opinions as to the frequency of occurrence of inner speaking.
Many authors hold that inner speaking occurs constantly or nearly so (Agnati et al., 2012; Baars,
2003; Archer, 2000). Hurlburt and Heavey, using the Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)
method to investigate the phenomenon, found inner speaking to occur in 23% of the samples
when averaging the data across two studies (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2008; Mihelic, 2010).
However, there were dramatic individual differences between people, with some having no
instances of inner speaking, others having nearly constant inner speaking, and others arrayed in
between (Hurlburt, Heavey & Kelsey, 2013).

Modern research into inner speaking
Many theories of the functions of inner speaking and its role in consciousness has been
advanced. Martines-Manrique and Vicente (2010) theorized that inner speaking was the medium
by which our thoughts were brought to consciousness. That is, we become aware of and able to
handle our own thoughts because we talk to ourselves about our thoughts. In their theory, inner
speaking could be unworded or partially worded because we have much contextual information
about ourselves and therefore do not need to elaborate (an explanation similar to Vygotsky’s
predication). Bermúdez (2003) proposed that although we have many different kinds of thoughts
6

and can be aware of them in their original forms (e.g., feelings, images, etc.), the only way that
we are able to think about our own thoughts is to use inner speaking. According to Bermúdez, to
attempt to think about our own thoughts without inner speaking is a prohibitively demanding
cognitive process; the use of an internal language allows us to work with, manage, and examine
thoughts. Prinz (2003, 2007) thought that inner speaking represented an “intermediate level”
between unconscious information of a highly abstract sort and unconscious information of a
concrete, mainly perceptual nature. Inner speaking is the way that information of both kinds are
brought into awareness and represented. Carruthers (2002, 2006) held that the mind is composed
of many different subsystems and that inner speaking comprises a common language between
them. Because the “language processer” includes both receptive and expressive functions, it is
well suited to this task. Through the medium of inner speaking, the mind is able to integrate
information from various different sources.
The results and theories we have discussed so far rely primarily on introspection and
questionnaire methods of studying inner speaking. In addition, however, researchers have used a
variety of performance-based methods to study inner speaking in various populations. It is of
note that many of these studies assume that handling linguistic information silently implies the
use of inner speaking, when this may not be the case (Hurlburt, 2011).
Morin, Uttl and Hamper (2011) used an open thought-listing procedure (simply writing
down what one thinks) to investigate the inner speaking in a sample of 380 undergraduates. They
then coded the listed thoughts into specific categories of function and topic. The investigators
found that people most frequently address inner speaking to themselves (self-referential activity),
and that the most common topics and functions of this was self-evaluation (e.g., appearance,
performance in a social context, etc.). When the speaking was addressed to others, the most
7

frequent targets of inner speaking were those close to the participant, such as a family member or
friends. Frequent content involved the future and presently occurring events. Morin and
colleagues highlight the limitations of the thought listing procedure, namely the possibility that
non-inner speaking content may be listed and the retrospective nature of the data collection.
Whitehouse, Mayberry, and Durkin (2006) theorized that there may be deficits in inner
speaking in autism. To test this, they compared a group of 20 autistic children with a group 20
controls on three different tasks measuring inner speaking. The tendency for pictures to be
recalled better than words is known as the picture superiority effect. One theory behind this is
that pictures require visual processing as well as inner speaking, whereas words require inner
speaking alone. If those with autism have deficits in their inner speaking, they should show less
of a picture superiority effect in their recall. In the first experiment, they had the two groups
complete a task that required them to remember a series of pictures that were presented to them
as well as a series of words. Those in the autistic group showed a significantly weaker picture
superiority effect than did those in the control group. In the second experiment, they tested inner
speaking use by looking at the word length effect, which is the tendency for shorter words to be
remembered better than longer words. The investigators presented both groups a list of long
words and a list of short words with the instructions to read them silently. Memory for both word
lists were tested, and the autistic group did not show as strong a word length effect as did the
control group. The investigators interpreted this as evidence that inner speaking was not used in
the task in the autistic group to the same extent that it was used by the controls. In the third
experiment, the two groups performed a set switching math task with and without articulatory
suppression (in addition to the task saying the months of the year to suppress inner speaking).
The investigators considered inner speaking to be an essential part of the task, and that
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articulatory suppression should affect performance. The investigators found that articulatory
suppression impeded the performance of the control group but did not significantly affect the
performance of the autism group.
Lidstone, Meins, and Fernyhough (2010) similarly used articulatory suppression to
interfere with the production of inner speaking during the performance of a task that involved
planning (the Tower of London test) to investigate the role of inner speaking in planful activities.
They had a group of 30 normally developing 7-10 year olds perform the test first with
articulatory suppression (repeating the word “Monday” constantly) and then with a foot tapping
task as a control. There were no significant differences between the articulatory suppression and
the foot tapping conditions. The authors theorized that perhaps simply doing the puzzle did not
evoke significant planning sufficient for an effect. In a second experiment, the investigators
required the children to announce their moves before they made them; they found that
articulatory suppression produced poorer performance on the test when compared to the foot
tapping control. The author interpreted this data as indicating that performance on the Tower of
London test was dependent on inner and self-directed speech.
Geva et al. (2011) studied the relationship between inner speaking and aphasia
developing after a stroke. They administered a battery of three inner speaking tests to 27 aphasic
stroke patients and to a group of 27 controls. The first test required the participants to judge if
two words rhymed or not (e.g., bear and chair). The second required the participants to judge if
two words were homonyms (e.g., might and mite). The third required the participants to judge if
a series of non-words rhymed (e.g., zoal and zole). The participants completed each of these tests
reading the words out loud as well as silently (with the intent of testing their inner speaking
abilities). Geva et al., found that across the stroke patients there was a wide spread of abilities
9

and disabilities. Most individuals had similar performances on both spoken and inner speech
tasks. However, some individuals with disturbed external speech had intact inner speaking
abilities, whereas others had the opposite pattern.
Corollary discharge is a prediction that the brain makes of the sensory feedback that
might be expected from any particular movement. By predicting this, this feedback is able to be
filtered out with the purpose of avoiding sensory confusion. Scott (2013) held that inner speaking
is a sort of corollary discharge-—a prediction of sensory feedback of one’s own voice. If inner
speaking is in fact corollary discharge, it should have an inhibitory effect on hearing. To test the
inhibitory potential of inner speaking, Scott used the Mann effect, a phonetic context effect
where a preceding vowel-consonant influences a following ambiguous consonant-vowel syllable.
Consider, for example, the syllable gha. The syllable pair ar-gha sounds like ar-da, whereas the
syllable pair al-gha sounds like al-ga. That is, the second syllable (gha), while objectively
identical in both situations, is heard differently (as da or ga). In actuality, gha is neither da nor
ga, but is perceived differently depending on what precedes it. If indeed inner speaking is
corollary discharge, than inner speaking should attenuate the effect of the proceeding syllable’s
influencing the second syllable. There were three conditions in the study. In the first condition,
participants listened to a recording of a context syllable and then repeated it mentally. In the
second condition, participants listened to a context syllable with no mental repetition. In the third
condition, the participants listened to a recording of a context syllable and then repeated a
different context syllable mentally. Scott found that the context effect was weaker in the group
that repeated the same context variable mentally and interpreted this as evidence that inner
speaking is a subset of corollary discharge.
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Various neuroimaging studies have investigated the neurological correlates of inner
speaking and related processes and have found various patterns of brain involvement in a variety
of tasks. There has been some lack of agreement as to what brain regions are associated with
inner speaking, and this may be due to the heterogeneity of methods used (Perrone-Bertolotti,
2014) and because the use different tasks can significantly affect the resulting patterns of brain
activation (Shergill et al., 2000). Areas most frequently found to be associated with inner
speaking are Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas in the left hemisphere (Huang, Carr, & Cao, 2002;
Ojemann et al., 1998; Newman & Twieg, 2001). A typical example of a neuroimaging study
investigating inner speaking is Shergill et al. (2001). Shergill et al. used fMRI to compare a
group of patients with schizophrenia to a group of healthy controls when they repeated a given
phrase silently. They found left-side activation in the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s area),
precentral gyrus (primary motor cortex), superior temporal gyrus (Wernicke’s area), and lingual
gyrus (an area associated with letter recognition). Activation was also observed in the
supplementary motor area as well as the right posterior cerebellar cortex. They did not find
differences in the pattern of activation between the schizophrenia patients and the control group
when they were engaged in the inner speaking task. McGuire, Silbersweig, and Frith (1996), in a
PET study of reading, found no difference in activation between reading aloud and reading
silently while listening to another voice read the same passage. In an fMRI study by Xiao et al.
(2005), participants read words and nonsense words silently (in Chinese); the researchers found
that although the patterns of activation were very similar between the two tasks, the left inferior
frontal gyrus (Broca’s area) was significantly more activated in the nonsense word condition.
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Questionnaire methods of studying inner speaking
Siegrist (1995), in investigating the link between self-talk and self-awareness, developed
the Scale for Inner Speech (SIS). The SIS is a 19-item questionnaire with items being rated on 6point Likert scales. The SIS does not distinguish between self-talk and inner speech, but rather
gives the instructions that “self-talk can either be spoken out loud or be only formulated in our
thoughts” (Siegrist, 1995). Thus, inner speech may be included in the broad category of “selftalk” but is not specifically targeted. Siegrist found that the SIS was positively correlated with a
measure of self-consciousness and negatively correlated with a measure of self-deception. This
questionnaire has not been used in any other studies.
Burnett (1996) developed the Self Talk Inventory (STI) by first asking a sample of
elementary school students (4th to 7th grade) what they would say to themselves in ten different
situations (e.g., "you have just received a really good mark on your math test"). The responses
were classified into positive, negative, or neutral responses. The three most common positive and
the three most common negative responses for each of the situations were included in the
questionnaire. Respondents indicate how often they say each of the 60 statements to themselves
in each of the imagined situations by endorsing Yes, Sometimes, or No. This instrument does not
distinguish between inner speech and audible self-talk (using the ambiguous instruction “say to
yourself”), and has been used in four studies, all with adolescents in a classroom setting. Burnett
(1996) used this instrument to examine the relationship between self-talk as measured by the STI
and the perceptions of positive and negative statements made by significant people in the
children’s lives (parents, teachers, etc.). This study used a sample of 675 elementary school
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students ages 7-13 and found that children who perceived that their significant others spoke
positively about them had a higher amount of positive self-talk and lower negative self-talk as
measured by the STI. Additionally, children who perceived that significant others spoke
negatively about them tended to score higher on negative self-talk and lower on positive self-talk
than did the first group.
Calvete and Cardeñoso (2002) used a Spanish version of the STI to investigate the
relationship between positive and negative self-talk and psychopathology as measured by the
Youth Self-Report (YSR; Achenbach, 1991) in a sample of 856 students aged 13-17. They found
that high amounts of self-talk (especially negative self-talk) as measured by the STI was
associated with high scores on the internalizing disorders subscale of the YSR, but found no
other relationships.
Burnett (2003) used a modified version of the STI to study the relationship between
teacher feedback and elementary school (3rd to 6th grade) students’ self-talk in the context of their
opinions of themselves as it related to reading and mathematics. The situations used in the
questionnaire were modified to reflect self-talk in reading or math situations that would be
encountered in school. Burnett found that students endorsing a pattern of high positive self-talk
and low negative self-talk perceived their teachers as providing a high amount of ability-related
feedback (e.g., “you have an ability to do math) and that those endorsing a pattern of high
negative self-talk perceived their teacher as providing a high amount of effort related feedback
(e.g., “you are working very hard right now”).
Calvete and Cardeñoso (2005) investigated the relationship of gender and vulnerability to
depression and behavior problems in adolescents, specifically the increased risk of depression for
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females and increased rates of externalizing problems for males. In this study, the STI was used
as a measure of automatic thoughts rather than a measure of self-talk or inner speech specifically.
The study used a sample of 856 adolescents aged 14–17 and explored the relationship between
irrational beliefs, social problem solving, and measures of problem behaviors using a variety of
instruments. Calvete and Cardeñoso found that female adolescents had lower levels of positive
thinking, higher levels of negative problem orientation, higher need for approval and success,
and a higher amount self-focused negative thoughts (as measured by the STI). Males scored
higher on measures of justification of violence, and endorsed a high level of careless and
impulsive problem solving behavior.
The Self-Talk Use Questionnaire (STUQ; Hardy, Hall, & Hardy) is a 59-item
questionnaire developed primarily for studying self-talk use by athletes. Aiming to be
descriptive, it asks questions designed to assess the content of athletes’ self-talk, the reasons that
they talk to themselves, when they talk to themselves, and so on. It is of note that the STUQ
includes items that specifically ask if self-talk occurs as out loud self-directed speaking or silent
inner speaking. An abbreviated version of the STUQ has also been examined to determine its
internal consistency and its test-retest reliability. Of the 24 items examined, 22 had good internal
consistency and test retest reliability (Hardy, Hall, & Hardy, 2005). The STUQ appears in only
these two papers.
The Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire (VISQ: McCarthy-Jones & Fernyhough,
2011) is a questionnaire that focuses exclusively on inner speech. It is an 18-item questionnaire
that was developed on a sample of 235 college students. Respondents rate their agreement with
statements such as “I talk back and forward to myself in my mind about things” on 6-point scales
between certainly does not apply to me and certainly applies to me. The VISQ is designed to
14

measure Vygostskian characteristics of inner speech such as dialogicity, condensation of the
words, and the presence of other people’s voices in inner speech. It has been used only in the
article in which it was published.
The Self Talk Scale (STS; Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009) is a 16-item scale in which
respondents rate the frequency in which they engage in self-talk in certain situations (e.g., “I talk
to myself when I should have done something differently”) on 5-point scales that range from
never to very often. This scale was developed on a sample of 207 college students and includes
instructions that define self-talk as “out loud or in your head.” That is, it specifically includes
inner speech as well as audible self-directed speech but does not distinguish between them.
Besides the paper in which it appeared, the STS has been used in two studies.
Reichl, Schneider, and Spinath (2013) used a German language version of the STS to
investigate the relationship between loneliness, the need to belong, mental and physical health,
and self-talk in a sample of 559 adults, finding that higher self-talk as measured by the STS was
associated with elevated scores on scales measuring loneliness and the need to belong.
Additionally they found that reported poor health was associated with higher degrees of reported
loneliness and self-talk.
Brinthaupt and Dove (2012) used the STS to study the differences in reported self-talk as
a function of the participants’ age, sex, if they had siblings or not, and if they reported having an
“imaginary friend” as a child. They found that, overall, males reported on the STS more self-talk
than did females, only children reported more self-talk than did those with siblings, and those
who reported having imaginary friends had a higher level of self-talk. Among the age groups,
those 21-30 years old reported the highest amount of self-talk, followed by the 41-54, 31-40, and
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18-20 year old age groups. It is of note that the finding of males’ reporting more self-talk is
similar to the finding of Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) which found a higher amount of inner
speech in males than in females.
Brinthaupt, Hein, and Kramer (2009) tested the construct validity of the STS by taking
the upper and lower quartile of a sample of respondents on the STS and administering the Padua
Inventory of Obsessive Compulsive Tendencies (Sanavio, 1988) and a measure the Need for
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The authors theorized that as obsessive compulsive
disorder is associated with negative self-talk, those scoring high in obsessive compulsive
tendencies should also score high on the STS. Likewise, the Need for Cognition Scale is a
measure of how much effortful cognitive activities are enjoyed. The authors theorized that
because self-talk is associated with thinking and problem solving, those reporting greater
amounts of self-talk should score highly on the STS as well. They found, as predicted, that
scores on the STS were correlated with scores of obsessive–compulsive tendencies (high group
mean=51.21, low group mean = 32.14, Cohen’s d; .80) and scores of enjoyment of effortful
cognitive activities (high group mean = 23.67, low group mean = 10.55, Cohen’s d; .64). This
indicates good construct validity. The STS has also been shown to have substantial stability: two
administrations three months apart were positively correlated (r = .66; Brinthaupt, Hein, &
Kramer, 2009)
The present study aimed to compare self-ratings of inner speech from a questionnaire
source with inner speech observed with DES. Among the reviewed questionnaires, the STS is
most appropriate for this purpose. First, although it does not distinguish between inner speech
and self-talk, it specifically includes inner speech. Second, it was developed using adult college
students (not athletes as the STUQ or children as the STI) and will be a better fit for our college
16

student sample. Third, the STS appears the most frequently in the literature and has been used in
a similar research capacity.
The Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ; Moynihan et al., 2015) is a 20-item
questionnaire designed specifically to inquire about experiential characteristics discovered by
DES, including inner speaking. Created for use in this series of studies, the NIEQ inquires about
the five kinds of inner experience that DES studies frequently find (inner speaking, inner seeing,
feelings, sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking), asking respondents to rate the
frequencies of these phenomena in their own inner experience and in the frequencies of people in
general. Responses are recorded on ten point visual-analog scales between never and always or
between none and all. This questionnaire is specifically focused on inner experience only (as
opposed to the STS which although specifically including inner speaking, also includes audible
speech).
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS OF STUDYING INNER EXPERIENCE
The prospect of studying human experience is fraught with concerns and difficulties, so
the strengths and weaknesses of each method of apprehending inner experience must be
considered carefully in the context of the research question. This section explores some methods
that have been used to study inner experience and weighs their appropriateness for the current
study.
Diary methods
Written narratives recorded in dairies are often used to study inner experience. These
methods have been used to study the inner experience of discrete events, types of inner
experience and general characteristics of inner experience across broader periods of time
(Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). Participants are asked to keep a written record of their
thoughts, actions, or in some cases the presence or absence of specific types of inner experience.
Diary methods may record information free form (e.g., Bartlett, 2012) or use a specific
framework of questions to record experience (e.g., Hedges et al., 1990; Mackinnon et al., 2014)
Fixed schedules, variable schedules, and event contingent schedules are often used in
diary studies. In fixed schedules, participants record their experience at a particular pre-agreed
upon time. Examples include completing the diary entry every evening at 8:00 pm, or continually
checking in every 5 minutes to record your experience. A diary method using a variable schedule
requires the participant to record their experience at randomly indicated times, usually signaled
by a beeper or a similar device. In event contingent schedules, the participants record their
experience when a particular event or phenomenon of interest occurs (e.g., in a study of anger,
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the participant records whenever she feels angry; in a study of eating, the participant records
whenever she eats, etc.). For studies that aim to apprehend inner experience as undisturbed as
possible, random schedules are preferred. The use of a random schedule keeps the participants
from disturbing their experience by anticipating the moment of interest: they may behave or
think differently because they know that they will be asked to record what they were doing.
Assessing inner experience at a random moment may help to reduce bias in reports by keeping
the participant from anticipating the recording and thus disturbing the content of the experience
(Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).
There are two primary ways of recording diary data. The older and more common
method is with paper and pencil. One strength of this approach is that most participants are
already familiar with how to use these methods and do not require much training (the procedure
does not differ much from a standard questionnaires or simple writing). The equipment is simple
to use and inexpensive. One of the downsides of using physical paper and pencil methods is
compliance with the study protocol: the participant must remember to use the booklet. Besides
honestly forgetting to use the diary, some participants may be tempted to misrepresent how well
they have complied with the experimenter’s protocol (e.g., filling out a whole week’s worth of
diary entries at one time) to avoid embarrassment. If paper and pencil methods are used to record
diary entries, it is not possible to monitor compliance with the method (Ellis-Davies et al., 2012).
The second method of recording diary entries is with electronic devices. Electronic data storage
devices are very versatile and can be configured to prompt participants to use the diary, as well
as monitor usage and compliance. There is evidence that electronic methods yield better quality
data and have a higher rate of compliance than do paper and pencil methods. Participants may
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also prefer to use electronic methods (Allena et al., 2012). They are, however, more expensive
than paper and pencil methods (Lam et al., 2010; Ireland et al., 2012).
Clinically, diary methods have been used as an intervention, and have been shown to
produce positive therapeutic effects (Hymer, 1991) in the treatment of conditions as diverse as
sexual concerns (Harvey, 2011), chronic pain (Kristjánsdóttir et al., 2013; Maikler et al., 2001),
weight loss and diet (Carter et al., 2013; Zepeda, & Deal, 2008), and coping with stress
(Devonport & Lane, 2014). One reason that they are so widespread is their ease of use and
adaptability to most situations provided the participants are willing and able to complete the
diary task.
Diary methods have strengths and weaknesses when used to investigate inner experience.
The open ended / unstructured nature of some kinds of diaries allows for the freedom to record
one’s personal feelings and experience in an unconstrained way. More specified methods, such
as traditional questionnaires, may artificially impose a structure that does not reflect the
participants experience as well as it could (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Stone et al.,
1991). Another advantage of diary methods is that they can be used to record experience quickly.
If a diary is properly implemented, time between the experience and report can be minimized and
thus reduce memory errors and biases (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).
Diary methods of apprehending inner experience have weaknesses. Although diaries can
be deployed quickly, they are also labor intensive on the part of the participant. Keeping a dairy
several or many times a day over several days can be taxing and intrusive on normal day to day
activities. Also, there is the possibility that knowing that you will be writing down your
experience may cause you to avoid certain kinds of socially undesirable activities and/or be
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selective about what you record (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). Furthermore, selective
remembering occurs when narratives are produced from experiences, and the resulting diary
entry may misrepresent the participants experience (Linden, 1993). Forgetting to use the diary
has been mentioned above, and those who record their experiences after they have happened may
distort or fabricate their experience (O’Conner et al., 2006, Green et al., 2009, Stone et al.,
2002).

Think Aloud and Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations
Think Aloud (TA) techniques attempt to examine presently occurring cognitions by
verbally describing them as they happen. During TA, participants are typically instructed to think
aloud during some task, and their verbalizations are recorded for later analysis. The instructions
vary in their format and may include additional instructions such as “don’t plan what to say or
speak after the thought, but rather let your thoughts speak” (Silviera, 1972), instructing
participants to focus more on articulating their thoughts than the task (Dunker, 1926), or
instructions that are meant to elicit specific kinds of mental content of interest, visual
perceptions, or physical sensations (Ericsson & Simon, 1984).
Ericsson and Simon (1984) held that TA methods could reasonably be assumed to be
objective and reliable in representing the inner experience of participants if they met two
conditions. First, the verbalizations analyzed need to be elicited during the task of interest and
not produced by undefined situations. That is, participants should be engaged in some purposeful
activity and not simply sitting and observing themselves statically. Secondly, the closer the
participant is able to keep his verbalizations to the contents of his short term memory (what is
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presently in experience) the better and the more useful the data generated will be. Ericsson and
Simon maintained that although many different kinds of verbal reports could be obtained, the
only verbal reports suitable for analysis are those obtained concurrently with the task performed
or those retrospectively recalled from what was concurrent from a previously performed task
(e.g., watching a video of oneself). Ericsson and Simon maintained that psychological states
were unknowable by introspection, but verbal reports of lower level cognitive processes could be
trusted. Second, to maintain objectivity, categorization criteria need to be agreed upon before the
data is obtained. The recordings produced from TA methods are coded and analyzed in various
ways, mostly driven by the research question.
A variant of the TA method is Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS;
Davison, Robins & Johnson, 1983). ATSS was conceived a way to study the cognitivebehavioral therapy (CBT) assumption that irrational preconceived notions about how the world
works are responsible for psychopathology. The method requires that a participant listen to a
prerecorded realistic situation (usually audio, but not necessarily), and imagine themselves as
participating in the scenario presented. The recording is punctuated by periods of silence (5-8
times every 30 seconds) during which the participant freely verbalizes his thoughts, feelings,
inner speech, etc. (Zanov & Davison, 2010). These verbalizations are recorded and later
analyzed, similar to traditional TA methods, in a variety of ways depending on the research
question.
Apart from irrational thoughts in the CBT model, ATSS has been used to study social
anxiety (Bates et al., 1996), anger and aggression (Barbour et al., 1998; Eckhardt, 2007;
Eckhardt & Crane, 2008), specific phobia (Mӧller et al., 1998), and eating disorders (Clyne &
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Blampied, 2004). ATSS has also been used as a measure of therapeutic change in a clinical
setting (e.g., Davison et al., 1991; Szentagotai et al., 2008; Clyne & Blampied, 2004).
TA and ATSS have the advantage of being easy to administer, relatively quick, and for
the most part require no special skill on the part of the investigators. Additionally it is easy to
elicit descriptions of inner experience in a variety of contexts. Both methods can customize
specific research questions easily and can be adapted to a variety of tasks and simulations. Also
when compared to other methods, the focus of TA and ATSS on immediately occurring
experience arguably lessens the chance that a participant may give a reaction to their inner
experience, rather than the experience itself (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995). This may
minimize recall errors as well (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). In the case of ATSS, situations which
may be difficult or unethical to bring into the laboratory can be investigated in imagination with
relative ease.
Using TA and ATSS to investigate inner experience has disadvantages. The process of
concurrently voicing ones inner experience has been criticized as being an inherently unnatural
process: data gleaned from such a method would lack ecological validity and experience would
likely be disturbed by the process of verbalization (Klinger 1975). Reports generated from the
process may also be influenced by the presence of the experimenter or the desire to present
oneself in a positive manner (Genest & Turk 1981). Another limitation is that TA and ATSS
assume that thoughts happen linearly, one after the other (Davison, Navarre, & Vogel, 1995).
This presumption excludes the possibility of simultaneously occurring thoughts; there is
evidence from other more naturalistic methodologies that multiple experience is common in
some individuals (Hurlburt, 2011). Additionally, participants may limit their responses to what
they think may be relevant to the circumstances of the experiment, or report only experiences
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that conform to preexisting presuppositions about what “should” be in their experience and
would likely misrepresent the content of the participant’s actual experience (Hurlburt & Heavey,
2003).
Experience Sampling Method and Momentary Ecological Assessment
One response to the various problems of diary methods, TA, and ATSS in the
apprehension of inner experience was the development of methods that sample specific moments
in natural environments. One such method is the Experience Sampling Method (ESM;
Csikszentmihalyi, Larson & Prescott, 1977). ESM seeks to apprehend inner experience,
behaviors, and environmental factors in a natural setting (Hormuth, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi &
Larson, 1987).
Procedurally, researchers using ESM provide their participants with a small portable
electronic device (programmable wristwatch, Palm Pilot, etc.) that delivers quasi random signals
(usually a beep or a vibration) on occasions throughout the day, and a booklet of self-report
questionnaires. The participants take the sampling device into their natural environment and
when signaled fill out a questionnaire called an Experience Sampling Form (ESF). The ESF
typically includes Likert-type scales to measure aspects of thinking, the intensity of various
emotions, and so on, as well as open ended questions such as “As you were beeped what was the
main thing you were doing?” The questions on the ESF vary according to the researcher’s
interest. ESF questionnaires typically take about two minutes to fill out. It is usual to collect
information over the course of a week (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987).
Like diary methods, ESM has been implemented using paper and pencil as well as with
electronic storage devices. Whereas the use of paper and pencil methods is cheap and easy, they
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have disadvantages. For example, when using paper and pencil the investigator does not have the
ability to monitor the interval between the signal and the time when the participant fills out the
ESF. Additionally, ESF forms can be bulky and inconvenient to carry along with the signaling
device and thus may negatively affect compliance.
Electronic devices such as palmtop computers can reduce these concerns. The same
equipment that delivers the signal can also be used to record the responses of the participants,
thus eliminating the need to carry paper forms. Compliance with the method can also be tracked
with the same device. Studies have indicated that the use of electronic devices in the method
increases the probability of a timely response to the signal (Barrett & Barrett, 2001). However,
the cost as well as the specialized nature of the programs required to track usage, deliver the
signal, and record responses may limit their availability (Stone, Kessler, & Haythornthwaite,
1991). ESM signaling and recording technology has also been adapted for use with a
smartphones (Randall & Rickard, 2013).
ESM is aimed at apprehending the inner experience of participants while taking into
account situational factors that occur in everyday life. Csikszentmihalyi and Larson describe the
purpose of ESM as making “the variations of daily experience, long outside the domain of
objectivity, available for analysis, replication, and falsifiability, thus opening up a whole range of
phenomena to systematic observation” (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). ESM has been used
to study the inner experience of adolescents (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984; Yip & Douglass,
2013), emotional reactions to music (Juslin et al., 2008), those suffering from schizophrenia
(Delespaul & deVries, 1987), paranoid delusions (Udachina et al., 2014) dissociative identity
disorder (Loewenstein, Hamilton, & Alagna, 1987), pain in cancer (Hedricks & Neville-Jan,
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1995), people with bulimia (Johnson & Larson, 1982), body image concerns (Fuller-Tyszkiewicz
et al., 2013), and risky behavior in young women (Farnworth, 1995).
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) is similar to ESM in its use of signals
delivered in a similar fashion to ESM but differs in that it often requires the participant to record
a physiological measure (e.g., blood pressure) along with (perhaps) a self-report measure. Also,
EMA typically employs a non-random signal schedule (unlike ESM, which is typically quasi
random) to focus on a time period of interest to investigators. Signals are typically delivered
several times over the course of a day, sometimes over the course of several weeks (Shiffman,
2000).
EMA’s inclusion of physiological measures has made it attractive to researchers
interested in medical topics. It has been used to study chronic pain (Bruehl et al., 2012), bariatric
surgery patients (Bond et al., 2013), migraine patients (Houtveen & Sorbi, 2013), tension
headaches (Kikuchi et al., 2011), insomnia (Miller et al., 2013) and habits of diet and exercise
(Spook et al., 2013). It has also been applied the research of substance abuse and dependence
(Lanza, Piper, & Shiffman, 2014; Buckner, Zvolensky, & Ecker, 2013; Marhe et al., 2013).
ESM and EMA have strengths. They are flexible enough to be used for either individual
case studies or to draw generalizations about larger groups of people (Csikszentmihalyi &
Larson, 1987). Additionally they are relatively simple for the participants using them and do not
require extensive training. They are also ecologically valid, the data being collected in the
participant’s natural environment or actual situation of interest rather than a laboratory (Stone,
Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). When non-sampling-based-study participants are asked to
summarize experiences over an interval of time, research suggests that more recent experiences
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influence recall to a greater extent than do experiences that are more distant (Schwarz &
Sudman, 1994). ESM and EMA avoid this bias by requiring reports immediately after the
signals, and also avoid the problem of decay of memory by minimizing the interval between the
event and the participant’s reports.
These methods have limitations. Because they both use a self-report questionnaire, they
are subject to biased or purposefully inaccurate reporting. Participants may be tempted to
misreport information that is embarrassing, sensitive, or that differs from preconceived notions
of what the participant expects in his experience. Also, the characteristics of inner experience are
not discussed very often in everyday speech, and participants may have a difficult time
expressing what was in their experience. Without the guidance of a researcher, an inexperienced
participant may simply not have the words to describe what was in experience (Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2007). Also, the data collection is not able to be monitored (unless electronic
recording devices are used), and adherence to the established protocol cannot be assured,
(Hormuth, 1992).
There are also concerns about the ESF questionnaire that is administered in the ESM
method. Questionnaire methods by virtue of their fixed nature assume that the participant’s
experience can be circumscribed within the bounds of the questionnaire. If the participant were
to have an experience that fell outside of what the questionnaire inquired about, the investigator
would not have a way to know about it and therefore would not receive a complete picture of
experience. This may result in participants selecting responses that are “close enough” but do not
describe experience accurately (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Although some of the
questions in the ESF are open ended, there is no way to know if the participant understood them
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or was able to express what was in his experience. Researchers also do not typically have a way
to ask a follow up question if the participant’s response was unclear.
There are limitations to EMA as well. First, as opposed to ESM’s questionnaires, EMA
frequently requires participants to learn, self-administer, and record physiological measures
(Shiffman & Stone 1998). This may preclude certain kinds of people from participating, creating
a selection bias in the pool of participants (Stone et al., 1999). Additionally, it is still an open
question the degree to which monitoring symptoms can interfere with the presentation of them.
For example, asking chronically ill patients about their pain might alter their experience of pain
(Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). Several studies have examined reactivity in EMA (Hufford
et al., 2002; Cruise et al., 1996; Heron & Smyth, 2013) but researchers have not yet reached a
consensus to what degree, if any, reactivity may affect EMA data.
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990) is another method of
apprehending inner experience. Similar to ESM and EMA, DES uses a random beeper to cue the
examination of particular moments of experience. Different from ESM and EMA, when the
participant hears the beep, she writes notes about what was in her experience. These notes then
serve to inform and constrain an open-beginninged and open-ended “expositional” interview
held within 24 hours of sampling (or sooner if desired). After several iterations of these sampling
day/ expositional interviews, investigators characterize the inner experience of the participants,
noting the characteristics and qualities unique to each participant.
DES aims at descriptions of “pristine” experience, experience that is undisturbed by
efforts to observe it (Hurlburt, 2011). DES is very careful to acknowledge the limitations
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inherent in self-report of experience and attempts to compensate for the various biases and
environmental factors that might interfere with the high fidelity apprehension of pristine
experience. These biases and factors may occur in the participants as well as investigators
(Hurlburt, 2011). Hurlburt has developed many technical aspects that thoughtfully and carefully
compensate for the weaknesses of other self-report methods with the intention of producing high
fidelity and detailed descriptions of moments of experience. Whether those aspects are adequate
must be examined in each situation.
The DES method collects ecologically valid data by instructing the participants to use the
beeper in their own natural environments while engaging in their everyday activities. The beep is
delivered in such a way as to be unambiguous to the participant. (That is, DES does not use
stimuli such as vibrating pagers or phone calls can be mistaken for things other than “sample
now!” beep and thus disturb experience before the cue has been completely recognized.) The
beeper uses an earphone so that its delivery cannot be confused with ambient sounds, and the
onset of the beep itself is abrupt so that the particular moment is unambiguously identified
(Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007). When the beep randomly sounds, participants attempt to
apprehend the ongoing experience and then write notes about it in a small notebook. After the
participant collects about six beeps, he meets with the investigators within 24 hours for an
expositional interview (Hurlburt, 2011). The interview asks about the beeped moments of
experience and is guided by a set of principles that are used to keep the description as “faithful”
to experience as possible (Hurlburt, 2011). This process is iterated over typically four or five
days. These iterations are not mere repetitions; that is the participant is not expected to have
proficiency in the method on the first sampling day. Instead, the expositional interview after the
first sampling day trains the participant to be more skillful on the second day; the second
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expositional interview trains the participant to be more skillful on the third day, and so on.
Because DES aims to provide detailed descriptions of experience, it has been used to explore the
experience of various populations including individuals with schizophrenia (Hurlburt, 1990),
depression (Hurlburt, 1993), anxiety (Hebert & Hurlburt, 1993), and Asperger’s syndrome
(Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), and bulimia (Jones-Forrester, 2006). Aside from clinical
populations, DES has been used to investigate the inner experience of groups of people who
simply share a characteristic such as a high rate of speech (Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002) and
those who are left handed (Mizrachi, 2010, 2014) By using DES to study the experience of those
who share traits, researchers can view commonalties that characterize a group, or are unique to
the individual participant (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).
An example of how DES has been able to find similarities in the sampled experience of
certain populations are the studies done with individuals with schizophrenia (Hurlburt, 1990;
Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987). These individuals experienced a high frequency of inner visual
experiences that were “goofed up” (tilted, obliterated, or inaccurate in detail). Also, although
many of the participants displayed blunted affect, their moment-by-moment inner emotional
experiences were clear or hyperclear. Another study found commonalties in individuals with
Asperger’s syndrome (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994). These individuals’ inner experience
consisted mainly of visual images, and did not include feelings, inner speech, or bodily
sensations. Additionally, these individuals had no experience more frequently than is typical in a
non-Asperger population (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). DES has found higher levels of selfcriticism in individuals with anxiety (Hebert & Hurlburt, 1993), elevated levels of unsymbolized
thinking in depressed individuals (Hurlburt, 1993), and multiple concurrent experiences in
women with bulimia nervosa (Jones-Forrester, 2006).
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Presuppositions about experience can influence the manner in which questions are asked
and the manner in which descriptions are interpreted. Presuppositions are formidable hurdles in
the apprehension of pristine experience (Hurlburt & Raymond, 2011). The DES method requires
the “bracketing of presuppositions” that is, the putting out of play of personally held biases and
theories that might influence an investigation. Bracketing presuppositions frees the investigator
to more fully apprehend pristine experience. Bracketing presuppositions is a skill DES
investigators must practice continually, and its focus on compensating for experimenter bias is a
strength of the method.
One of the ways DES uses to bracket presuppositions is to attempt to be unbiased in the
interviews. There are no set questions that are used, and the direction of the interview is
determined largely by the participant’s report of experience. Although the questions used in each
interview vary, they are all variants or amplifications of “what, if anything, was in your
experience at the moment of the beep?” This is an “open beginninged” (Hurlburt, 2011)
question—it does not specify a priori the nature of the experience to be discussed, so that the
interview takes place on what the participant describes, not on what the investigator is interested
in. DES uses many techniques to help bracket presuppositions. For example, in asking questions
DES investigators frequently present several equally plausible alternative responses, giving
preference to none. This is a way to mitigate the inclination that some participants have to give
the investigator what he is looking for, as well as keeping any preconceived notions that the
investigator may hold from influencing the description of experience (Hurlburt, 2011).
The beginning stages of the interview process in DES serves a unique purpose. DES
accepts that most participants are not skilled in apprehending their own experience, and the first
few interviews serve to help the participant become familiar with the task and practice the skills
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required. Hurlburt (2009) describes DES as “iterative,” meaning that repeated, successive
approximation practice on the part of the participants is required. Focusing on exactly what
moment is signaled by the beep, distinguishing external events from inner experience, and
describing their experience is frequently difficult for participants and they require the guidance
of the investigators. Misunderstandings of the task are also common, as well as
misunderstandings of what constitutes experience (Hurlburt, 2011). The first several (typically
one or two days) of the sampling/interview process are essential for learning the task, and the
quality of the descriptions typically steadily increase as the sampling days progress. In practice
this means that the first few days of reports of experience may not be trustworthy. However,
because of the iterative process of DES, early mischaracterizations of experience can be replaced
by later, more trustworthy, descriptions. This recognition of the participant’s learning curve of
apprehending experience and the steps taken to compensate are a major component of DES.
DES has the advantage of being applicable to most activities in which an investigator
might be interested. Its openness to whatever may be in experience (not simply what might be
expected in experience) is a distinct advantage that it has over questionnaire methods. Whereas
questionnaires produce patterns of responses to specific questions, DES produces detailed
descriptions of individual moments of experience and their salient characteristics. DES
researchers do not make inferences about experience based on response to an a priori question;
they refine a series of questions led by the unfolding description of the experience. For each
sampled moment, investigators typically write a short paragraph describing the experience. After
a course of several sampling days, this series of carefully described individual experiences are
examined for salient characteristics, which may be recurrently appearing content but may also be
a feature of a single moment’s experience if it is deemed that that moment is understood in high
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fidelity. On the basis of that examination, a characterization of the experience of a particular
participant is typically written.
Although DES takes pains to be open to all kinds of experience, studies utilizing the
method frequently discover five phenomena (inner speaking, inner seeing, unsymbolized
thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) that have become known
as the Five Frequent Phenomena (5FP; Kühn et al., 2014). These phenomena are broad
classifications that describe frequently encountered inner experiences. Inner seeing can be
defined as seeing something in imagination that is not actually present. Unsymbolized thinking is
the experience of thinking a particular, definite thought without the awareness of that thought’s
being conveyed in words, images, or any other symbols. Feelings are affective experiences, such
as sadness, happiness, humor, anxiety, joy, fear, nervousness, anger, embarrassment etc. Sensory
awareness is the experience of paying attention to a particular sensory aspect of the environment
such as color, smell, or texture (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Inner speaking has been defined
above.
It should be emphasized that inner experience often (perhaps usually) does not fit well
into one of these categories, and individual experiences may fit into several of these categories
simultaneously, or fit into none of them at all.
Although DES maintains ecological validity by collecting samples in a naturalistic
environment, there are concerns about the validity of the descriptions of experience. How, for
example, might an investigator know if the description given by a participant actually describes
an experience? There is evidence that descriptions of experience should not be implicitly trusted
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). DES aims at a “co-investigator” relationship with the participant
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(Hurlburt, 2011) wherein the investigator and the participant work together on the descriptions,
including working together to understand the fidelity of the descriptions. This attitude of coinvestigator with the investigator also mitigates the tendency that participants may have toward
positive self-presentation (Genest & Turk, 1981). Participants receive explicit instructions that
they might decline to describe experience that may be embarrassing or personal (Hurlburt, 2011).
DES aims at describing pristine experience in high fidelity, but acknowledges the limitations of
the method. By being willing to accept that some experiences may not be accessible,
investigators seek to raise the fidelity of the descriptions that they do collect. Becoming willing
to accept “I don’t know” as a valued answer to a question about experience is an integral part of
the method. Additionally, participants may selectively remember and misrepresent their inner
experience when asked to describe it over extended spans of time (Linden, 1993). DES avoids
this pitfall by its exclusive focus on “the moment of the beep.”
But how do investigators know when they should be mistrustful of a description on
experience? One important thing that interviewers look for are instances of “subjunctification,”
that is, any words or body language that suggests that the participant may not be describing the
beeped experience. Subjunctification is so named because participants often use verbs in the
“subjunctive” mood (e.g., I would think...) when they are not describing experience directly.
Statements such as these indicate that what is being described is the result of a presupposition or
plausibility, not necessarily a description of an observed experience. Subjunctification can also
include reference to assumed past experience (“I do this when that happens”), statements of
universality (“this always happens”), and statement of causality ( non-experientially present
explanations such as “I experienced that because…”). Also included as subjunctification are
behaviors such as appearing uncomfortable or unsure, long pauses, and checking for the approval
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of the investigators. Subjunctification can be a sign that the participant lacks faith in his
description of experience and is seeking to qualify his uncertainty. Conversely, when participants
speak confidently and with clarity, this can be a sign that they are speaking directly about
experience. The presence of subjunctifiers in itself does not preclude a faithful description, as
their presence may be due to other legitimate reasons (e.g., embarrassment, unfamiliarity with
the task, difficulty articulating experience or individual personality). Investigators should,
however note their presence and use the information to help distinguish trustworthy accounts of
experience from untrustworthy ones (Hurlburt, 2011).
The many steps that DES takes to compensate for the various pitfalls of self-report are
designed to increase the chances that a faithful description of experience will be produced.
However, one of the weaknesses of DES is that it is difficult on the part of investigators who are
new to the method to implement effectively all of the principles that lead to faithful apprehension
of experience. To become proficient in DES requires a significant amount of time and practice.
An additional weakness is that there does not presently exist a way to quantify the skill of an
interviewer or the success of any one interview. Interviews are always recorded for later review,
but quality control is still a concern.
Another weakness of DES is the significant time it requires for both the participants and
the investigators. On each sampling day, the participant must wear the beeper for several hours
and participate in an interview that typically lasts an hour. Multiplied by four to eight
sampling/interview days, this can become tiresome or intrusive for the participants and may lead
to attrition. Additionally, the labor intensive nature of DES restricts the number of participants
who can be included in any one study due to reasons of practicality.
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Notwithstanding these limitations, DES was well suited to the needs of the study, which
sought to explore the inner experience of those rating themselves high on inner speech and those
rating themselves low on inner speech. Its ecological validity and focus on efforts to mitigate
both researcher and participant bias provided the possibility that its descriptions of inner
experience were as faithful as possible. Furthermore, its open format potentially allowed aspects
of experience that may have been missed with other methodologies to be apprehended.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Overview
The present study was composed of two phases: the screening phase and the sampling
phase. The study is part of a larger study that will not be described here, including a third phase
which took place after the two phases of the study described here had concluded.
Undergraduate volunteers (N = 260) taking introductory psychology courses at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas completed a screening questionnaire that asked them to rate
their self-talk, a general inner experience questionnaire designed for this study, a measure of
psychopathology, and a short demographic form. Those scoring in the upper and lower quartiles
of the self-talk screening questionnaire were invited to the sampling phase.
Sixteen participants (6 from the lower quartile and 10 from the upper quartile as
identified in the screening phase) constitute the DES group and continued into the sampling
phase. Their inner experience was studied using the DES method.
Instruments
The Self Talk Scale (STS; Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009) was used as the screening
questionnaire in this study. The STS is a 16-item questionnaire that uses 5-point Likert scales
(from never to always) to ask about the frequency of self-talk / inner speech behaviors in various
situations. It thus produces a total score between 16 and 80. Brinthaupt, Hein, and Kramer (2009)
showed that the STS has good test-retest reliability (r(99) = .66, p <.001), and that those
identified as frequent self-talkers using the STS have been shown to have significantly higher
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STS scores (t = 2.69, df = 44, p < .01) on a measure of obsessive compulsive tendencies (Padua
Inventory of obsessive–compulsive tendencies; Sanavio, 1988) than did those identified as
infrequent self-talkers. Obsessive compulsive tendencies are thought to involve self-talk.
Similarly, those identified as frequent self-talkers using the STS have been shown to have
significantly higher scores (t = 2.16, df = 44, P < .05) on a measure of enjoyment of effortful
cognitive activity (Need for Cognition Scale; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) than those
identified as infrequent self-talkers using the questionnaire. Effortful cognitive activity are also
thought to involve self-talk (Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009).
The Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire (NIEQ) is a 20-item questionnaire designed
for this series of studies as a way to compare as directly as possible inner experience as
apprehended by DES to inner experience as reported by questionnaire. The NIEQ asks
respondents to rate the frequencies of the 5FP in their own inner experience and in the
experience of people in general. Responses are recorded on 10-point visual-analog scales
between Never and Always or between None and All. The first ten items ask about the
participant’s own experience; the second ten ask about the participant’s view of people in
general. The present study uses only the first ten. Those ten items include two items for each of
the 5FP Ratings on each of these pairs of items were averaged together to produce a score which
can be considered an estimate of the percentage of time an individual spends engaged in each
category of experience. The NIEQ was shown by confirmatory factor analysis to have five
factors corresponding to those five pairs (Moynihan, in preparation).
The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a 90-item self-report
questionnaire that measures an individual’s psychological challenges. The SCL-90-R uses fivepoint Likert scales to rate the frequency of a symptom’s occurrence. It has subscales measuring
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somatization, obsessive-compulsive traits, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility,
phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. The SCL-90 shows high concurrent validity
with other instruments. Weissman et al. (1977) found correlations with the Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D) ranging from .72 to .84 across various
populations. The SCL-90 also displays convergent validity with the MMPI, with correlations
between related subscales ranging from .40 to .75 (Derogatis, Rickels, & Rock, 1976). Derogatis
and Cleary (1977), using factor analysis, found high construct validity for the subscales of the
SCl-90. Horowitz et al., (1988) found good test-retest reliability with correlations between
administrations given 10 weeks apart ranging from .68 to .83 across the different subscales.
A demographic questionnaire, designed for this study, asked participants to provide their
name, preferred phone number, age, race/ethnicity, sex, marital status, education level, and
employment.
Apparatus
Those selected to be in the DES group used a random-interval device (beeper) developed
by Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002). The beeper is pocket sized (3 in by 4 in) rectangular
device that has an adjustable volume. At randomly selected intervals (mean 30 min; minimum a
few seconds; maximum one hour), the beeper delivers a 700Hz tone via an earphone.
Those sampled using DES also received a small spiral bound notebook for jotting notes
about their inner experience.
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Screening phase
Participants
This study involved two groups of participants. The “screened group” consists of 260
undergraduate students from the University of Nevada Las Vegas psychology subject pool
participated in the screening phase of the study. The “DES group,” a subset of the screened
group, consists of 16 screened-group participants, 6 of whom scored in the top quartile and 10
who scored in the bottom quartile of the STS and who agreed to participate in the sampling
phase.
To determine quartile cutoffs, we began with 60 and 45, cutoffs derived from Brinthaupt,
Hein, and Kramer’s (2009) validity study of the STS. Half way through data collection we
discovered that our sample had a somewhat higher mean and standard deviation than did
Brinthaupt et al., so we revised the cutoffs to quartiles based on our first 112 screen participants,
using the upper quartile STS cutoff to be 66 and the lower quartile cutoff to be 52. Investigators
were kept blind to group status. This study aimed to have nine participants in the High-STS
group and nine in the Low-STS group. However, recruitment for those in the Low-STS group
was difficult due to unknown factors, resulting in 10 High-STS group participants and 6 LowSTS group participants. Screened-group participants were given .5 research subject-pool
participation credits; DES-group participants received 1 subject-pool credit and $10 for each
hour of participation.
As part of a course requirement, undergraduate students were given the option to
participate in the screening in exchange for .5 research participation credits. Participants had the
option of declining further participation in the study at any time.
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Procedure
Participants met with the researchers in the Descriptive Experience Sampling Lab. After
obtaining informed consent, participants were administered the STS, NIEQ, SCL-90-R and the
demographic form. This took approximately twenty minutes; these 260 participants comprised
the screened group.
The NIEQ was administered for comparative purposes as well as part of a validation
study of this instrument.
A previous study has found that higher levels of inner speech are associated with lower
levels of psychological distress (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008), so the SCL-90-R was used to assess
the relationships between inner speech and psychological distress.

Sampling Phase
Participants
Participants who scored below 52 or above 66 on the STS in the screening phase were
invited to participate in the sampling phase.
Procedure
All participants and investigators were kept blind to group membership. These
participants individually met with DES investigators approximately six times in the DES lab at
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) campus. The first meeting introduced the
participant to the procedure, completed the informed consent for this phase, familiarized them
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with the operation of the beeper, and answered any questions. The next four meetings (sampling
phase meetings 2-5) were 1-hour long expositional interviews. During the expositional
interviews the DES investigators interviewed the participant about the moments of experience
that were indicated by the random beeper during the previous 24 hours. The last meeting
(meeting 5) included a debriefing as well as an expositional interview. DES group participants
received five dollars compensation per interview as well as one hour subject pool credit.

Meeting 1: Orientation
DES group participants met in the DES lab at the UNLV campus. The sampling phase of
the study was completely described and they were asked to give informed consent; they were
also informed that they may discontinue their participation in the study at any time. They were
introduced to the task and familiarized with the operation of the beeper. DES group participants
were also informed that the interview would be video recorded and that they may request that the
tapes be destroyed at any time.
DES group participants were also given a pocket sized notebook to record the
experiences indicated by the beeps. They were instructed to wear the beeper during everyday
activities until they have responded to six beeps, which typically takes approximately three
hours, during the 24-hours immediately before the next scheduled meeting. DES group
participants were instructed that when the beep sounds, they should pay attention to the last
undisturbed moment of experience before the onset of the beep, and to jot down notes about that
experience in the notebook. The DES group participants were also told that they may decline to
discuss any beeped experience.
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Meetings 2-5: Expositional Interviews and Debriefing
Within 24 hours of collecting the six beeped samples of experience, each DES group
participant returned for an hour-long expositional interview to discuss the six collected moments
of experience. The expositional interview was conducted by between two and five investigators,
and has three purposes: to train the participant to become more skilled at sampling during the
next sampling period, to allow the investigators to develop skills at apprehending the
participant’s talk, and to clarify the beeped experience of the participant. The interview depends
on the particular characteristics of the participant’s experience and the participant’s particular
ability or inability to apprehend those characteristics, and thus varied greatly from participant to
participant. However, all questions asked are attempts to home in on high fidelity answers to the
question “what was your experience at the moment of the beep?” Frequently, instead of
describing the particular experience that was ongoing at the moment of the beep, participants
will describe the circumstances leading up to the beep, content that came before the beep,
content that came after the beep, or generalizations about their own or others’ inner experience.
All questions asked by the investigators are attempts to help the participant describe in higher
and higher fidelity (as the participant becomes more and more skilled) the characteristics of the
experience that was ongoing at the moment of the beep. Arriving at a faithful description of
experience is thus a collaborative process between the participant and the investigators, each
helping to guide the interview toward the experience that was ongoing at the moment of the
beep. The DES method is thus an iterative process (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011) designed to help the
participants gain skill at apprehending and describing their experience as the sampling procedure
progresses. Because the participants are learning a new skill, the first day of the interviews is
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considered more of an opportunity for training rather than data collection, and data collected
during the first day is discarded.
After the first sampling day and expositional interview, the DES group participant again
wore the beeper in her natural environments and again collected six beeped experiences.
Because of the training received during the first expositional interview, the participant is likely to
be more skillful at apprehending experience. Then the participant returns for an expositional
interview about those experiences. Because the participant is more skillful in apprehending
experience, the next expositional interview was likely to produce higher fidelity descriptions as
well as to provide yet another increment in skill at apprehending experience.
This natural-environment-sample and then expositional-interview procedure was repeated
three more times, for a total of five natural-environment sampling periods and five expositional
interviews.
The last of the five sampling days is part of a separate study investigating the inner
experience of reading. DES group participants read two short stories on a computer monitor, and
beeps were delivered with an earphone using the computer rather than a beeper. The reading task
was performed in whichever location was convenient for the participant, the story and beeps
being delivered by a website.
Debriefing
At the conclusion of their participation (which may include a third phase of the study not
described here), participants were encouraged to ask any questions they may have about the
method or their participation. Questions were answered completely and forthrightly.
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Sampling Data
The basic sampling data from this study consists of moments of experience that are
selected by the random beep. The participant and investigators then cooperatively characterized
these experiences during the course of the expositional interview. Within a few hours after the
interview, one investigator produced a detailed description of each beeped experience, aided by
notes taken during the interview and perhaps returning to the video recording of the interview.
Those descriptions were then circulated to the other investigators for editing, disagreement,
difference in emphasis or connotation, and so on. Sometimes consensus was reached in those
discussions. Sometimes the investigators returned to the videotape in an effort to clarify aspects
of the experience; that videotape review sometimes resulted in consensus. Sometimes, however,
consensus was not reached about some aspect of the experience. The written descriptions of the
sampled experience that resulted from these discussions were left showing any disagreements or
differences in connotation on the possibility that later samples might illuminate a characteristic
of the earlier sample.
This procedure was repeated across four sampling days, producing between 15 and 18
descriptions per participant in the DES group (excluding the first day). When all sampling days
were complete for any individual participant, the investigators who had been involved in any of
the interviews with that participant met and discussed each of the sampled experiences, using
memory, notes, and the written raw descriptions as aids to recollection. Here again, sometimes
consensus was reached in those discussions; sometimes an agreement to disagree was reached;
sometimes the investigators returned to the videotape in an effort to clarify aspects of the
experience. Across this discussion, salient characteristics emerged and were discussed.
Following this meeting, each investigator independently (blind to each other’s descriptions)
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wrote a brief description of the emergent features of the participant’s experience. Then the brief
descriptions were circulated and compared, and one description of the participant’s experience
was written. Here again, the process allowed for minority positions to be sketched and kept in
play for the remainder of the study. This procedure was repeated for all 16 DES group
participants.

Classification of sampled experiences
After each DES group participant’s inner experiences had been sampled, those
experiences were coded as to whether any (or several) of the five frequently occurring
phenomena (5FP) were present. Similar to the procedure when the experiences were first
described, the researchers independently and blind to each other rated and classified each
experience (the 5FP as well as other experiences). The researchers then met to discuss and
compare their ratings. Where there was disagreement in the classification of an experience, the
experience was discussed until either a consensus was reached or the issue could not be resolved,
in which case the 5FP category was coded as .5.
Identifying the 5FP in experience is a complex process. With some experiences the 5FP
classification is readily apparent. This example is the first sampled moment of experience from
“Pamela’s” fourth sampling day:
Pamela 4.1: At the moment of the beep, Pamela was innerly saying “diatom” in her own
voice with no inflection. She had been repeating the word “diatom” over and over in her
head, and the beep caught her on one of the repetitions.
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This is a clear example of inner speaking, and was coded as such.
Other experiences are less clear. For example:
Georgia 4.5: Georgia was brushing her teeth. At the moment of the beep she was thinking
something like “you’ve got to get up early to take Jaime in to the airport in the morning.”
This may have been innerly spoken in her own voice but without any words present. We
were unable to determine how this idea was present, though there was a sense that innerly
speaking may have been involved even though there were not specific words. It is also
possible (or even likely) that this was an example of unsymbolized thinking in a person
who had not yet accepted the possibility of that phenomenon.
In this example, the participant and researchers were not able to distinguish confidently
whether the experience was inner speaking or unsymbolized thinking. There were aspects of the
experience that suggested inner speaking, so, we coded the experience as “.5” of an occurrence
of inner speaking and .5 unsymbolized thinking.
Some moments of experience contain multiple categories of the 5FP. For example:
Harrison 4.2: Harrison felt pain in the tip of his tongue where he had just bit it. He
described the pain as 7 out of 10 in terms of painfulness, and it was occupying 80% of his
experience. The other 20% of his experience was saying to himself “Who bites their
tongue?” in his own silent voice, in an exasperated tone. This inner speaking was of
normal speed, was louder than his normal inner speaking volume, and just a little softer
than his normal speaking aloud voice.
This experience was coded as both sensory awareness and inner speaking.
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Additionally, many participants had recurring themes or favored a certain kinds of
experience which did not fit any of the 5FP categories. Those idiographic categories were
described by the investigators but are not included in this study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This study explored the relationships between self-reported inner experience as
apprehended by the Self Talk Scale (STS) and the Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire
(NIEQ) and pristine inner experience as apprehended by Descriptive Experience Sampling
(DES). Additionally the study explored the relationships between a measure of psychological
distress (SCL-90-R) and inner experience.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for questionnaires in both the screened group
(N = 260) and DES groups (upper quartile on the STS, N = 10; and lower quartile on the STS,
(N = 6) used in the study. We begin by examining the STS column. The STS can be taken as a
self-report measure of the frequency of inner speech. Preliminarily we note that the mean STS
score for all participants in our study (shown in the “All” row at the top left of Table 1) was
59.01, significantly higher (t = 5.56, df = 465, p < .001) than the mean of 53.52 reported by
Brinthaupt et al. (2009) in their STS validation study (shown for comparison in the bottom row
of Table 1).
We used the STS upper and lower quartiles to screen participants. Table 1 shows that the
means of those quartiles for all participants (71.35 and 45.51) were significantly different from
each other (as would be expected: t = 27.98, df = 117, p<.001).
Our High-STS group DES participants were a sample from the screened upper quartile;
the mean of the High-STS group DES participants (71.40) was very similar to the mean of the
upper quartile of all participants (71.35; t = .034, df = 68, p = .97). The Low-STS Group DES
participants’ mean STS score (42.00) was very similar to the mean of the lower quartile of all
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Table 1: Questionnaire Descriptive statistics: Means and (Standard Deviations)

STS
N

Screened group
Des group

Participants

All

260

Upper quartile

60

Lower quartile

59

t (df = 117)
p
d
All

16

High-STS

10

Low-STS

6

t (df = 14)
p
d
Brinthaupt et al.
(2009)

207

SCL-90R

NIEQ percentages

total
score
M(SD)

total
score
M(SD)

ISa
M(SD)

59.01
(9.87)
71.35
(3.90)
45.51
(5.98)
27.98
.000
5.12
60.38
(15.59)
71.40
(4.97)
42.00
(6.00)
10.62
.000
5.34
53.52
(11.55)

84.01
(52.50)
93.92
(54.46)
65.17
(38.59)
3.32
.001
0.61
73.19
(46.33)
86.90
(48.98)
50.33
(33.42)
1.61
.130
0.87

68.32
(17.14)
77.37
(13.29)
55.49
(18.66)
7.38
.000
1.35
66.63
(25.60)
81.33
(9.65)
42.13
(25.42)
4.45
.001
2.04
-

-

a

IMG
M(SD)

UNS
M(SD)

FEEL
M(SD)

M(SD)
66.08
(20.71)
73.59
(22.68)
60.17
(21.86)
3.28
.001
0.60
69.03
(27.25)
72.03
(28.38)
64.04
(27.00)
0.55
.588
0.29
-

37.77
(23.36)
40.24
(24.51)
39.89
(22.85)
0.08
.936
0.01
38.75
(25.32)
35.45
(27.16)
44.25
(23.19)
-0.66
.520
-0.35
-

74.31
(17.87)
82.10
(16.08)
65.58
(18.40)
5.22
.000
0.96
79.06
(19.96)
87.15
(13.24)
65.58
(23.04)
2.40
.031
1.15
-

IS= Inner Speaking, IMG=Inner Seeing, UNS= Unsymbolized Thinking, FEEL=Feelings,
SENS=Sensory Awareness
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SENS

61.91
(17.52)
65.96
(18.30)
62.00
(16.00)
1.26
.211
0.23
68.55
(18.70)
70.63
(18.89)
65.08
(19.59)
0.56
.584
0.29
-

participants (45.51; t = 1.37, df = 63, p = .18). Our aim was to obtain DES groups that were
different from each other in self-reported inner speech, and we were successful in doing so: the
High-STS group mean was 71.40 and the Low-STS group mean was 42.00 (t = 10.62, df = 14,
p<.001). Altogether, these results suggest the High-STS and Low-STS DES groups were
representative samples from the upper and the lower quartiles screened with the STS and were
indeed very different from each other on questionnaire-reported inner speech.
Table 1 also shows analogous statistics for the SCL-90-R (a self-report measure of
psychological distress). The SCL-90-R scores were significantly different between the upper and
lower quartiles of the screening group (upper mean = 93.92, lower mean = 65.17, t = 3.32, df =
117, p = .001), with those in the upper quartile (higher self-reported inner speech) reporting more
psychological distress. The DES High-STS group and Low-STS group differed in the same
direction (High-STS group mean = 86.90, Low-STS group mean = 50.33), but this difference
was not statistically significant (t = 1.61, df = 14, p = 0.13).
Finally, Table 1 shows the NIEQ (a self-report of the five most frequently occurring
phenomenon in experience or 5FP) means and standard deviations broken down the same way.
We first look at the screened (N = 260) group. First and predictably, those scoring in the upper
and lower quartile of the STS also had significant differences (upper mean = 77.37, lower mean
= 55.49; t = 7.38, df = 117, p = .000) on the inner speaking items of the NIEQ (NIEQ-IS).
However, the upper-STS-quartile group also had significantly higher scores on self-ratings of
inner seeing (NIEQ-IMG; upper mean = 73.59, lower mean = 60.17, t = 3.28, df = 117, p = .001),
and feelings (NIEQ-FEEL; upper mean = 82.10, lower mean = 65.58, t = 5.22, df = 117, p<
.001). Sensory awareness (upper mean = 65.96, lower mean = 62.00) and Unsymbolized thinking
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(upper mean = 40.24, lower mean = 39.89) was not significantly different between the upper and
lower STS quartile of the screened groups (NIEQ-SENS; t = 1.26, df = 117, p = 0.211, NIEQUNS; t = 0.08, df = 117, p = .936).
Considering next the NIEQ ratings for the DES group (N = 16), we see a similar trend as
in the screened group: the High-STS group self-reported significantly more inner speaking than
did the Low-STS group (NIEQ-IS ; High-STS group mean = 81.33, Low-STS group mean =
42.13, t = 4.45, df = 14, p = .001) as well as feeling (NIEQ-FEEL; High-STS group mean =
87.15, Low-STS group mean = 65.58, t = 2.40, df = 14, p = .031). However, unlike the screened
group, there was not a difference in the amount of self-reported inner seeing (NIEQ-IMG; HighSTS group mean = 72.03, Low-STS group mean = 64.04, t = 0.55, df = 14, p = .588). These
results suggest that the screening questionnaire separated the participants into two groups with
distinct retrospective ideas about their own experience as a whole (not simply inner speaking).
Table 2 elaborates the results that were summarized in the first row of Table 1, showing
correlations in the screened group (N = 260) among the STS, SCL-90-R, and NIEQ scales. The
primary focus of this study is inner speaking. There is a strong positive correlation (.52) between
the STS and the NIEQ-IS (the inner speaking scale of the NIEQ). This relationship is also
illustrated in Figure 1. That this correlation is less than 1.0 reflects sampling error as well as the
imperfect overlap of these two questionnaires (the STS includes audible speech as well as inner
speaking, whereas the NIEQ inquires only about inner speaking). Not shown in the table, the
correlation between the STS and NIEQ-IS was also strong (.83) among the DES participants
(N=16). This relationship is shown in Figure 2. Other strong correlations (p < .01) between the
various questionnaires are marked by a double asterisk (**), but as the aim of this study is
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Table 2: Questionnaire correlationsa across all participants (screened group)
STS

NIEQ

SCL-90-R

Total
score

a

SCL-90R
Total
score

NIEQ
ISb

IMG

UNS

Total
score

0.24**

ISa

0.52**

0.12

IMG

0.27**

0.27**

0.30**

UNS

0.01

0.06

-0.13

FEEL

0.36**

0.29**

0.21** 0.27** 0.05

SENS

0.13

0.23**

0.08

FEEL

0.02

0.43** .31**

0.35**

df = 258

b

IS= Inner Speaking, IMG=Inner Seeing, UNS= Unsymbolized Thinking, FEEL=Feelings,
SENS=Sensory Awareness
** p < .01, not corrected
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Figure 1: STS total score and NIEQ-IS across all participants (screened group)
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Figure 2: STS total score and NIEQ-IS across DES sampled participants (DES group)
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exploratory, they should be taken as suggesting relationships and have not been corrected by
procedures such as suggested by Bonferroni.
Table 3 presents the study’s main results, from two perspectives. First, the middle panel
of Table 3 presents the main DES sampling results–the DES 5FP percentages–for all our DES
participants and for those in the High-STS group and Low-STS group. Here we are particularly
interested in the Inner Speaking (IS) column of Table 3, where we see that inner speaking
occurred in 14.99 percent of all our DES participants’ samples. The High-STS group had a
higher percentage of inner speaking in their experience than did the Low-STS group (High-STS
group percentage = 17.81%, Low-STS group percentage = 10.30%); however, that difference
was not statistically significant. The DES apprehended inner speaking for the High-STS and the
Low-STS groups is shown in Figure 3 as a function of STS score and in Figure 4 as a function of
NIEQ-IS score. The only statistically significant difference in the sampled experience of the
High-STS group and Low-STS group was unsymbolized thinking, with the High-STS group
having a significantly lower percentage (High-STS group percentage = 7.03%, Low-STS group
percentage = 18.31%; t = -2.26, df = 14, p = 0.040) than did the Low-STS group. Second, Table
3 compares DES sampling to the retrospective questionnaire results, comparing the 5FP
percentages as found by DES sampling to their retrospective ratings on the NIEQ questionnaire
(repeated from Table 1 for comparison). There are very large differences between the
percentages from the DES sampling and the corresponding NIEQ questionnaire results, with
self-ratings being much larger for all categories of experience. For example, our High-STS group
participants prior to DES sampling retrospectively characterized (on the NIEQ) their inner
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Table 3: DES group 5FP percentages and NIEQ values for comparison
DES
Group

N

DES 5FP percentages

All

Particip.
16

Samp.
270

High-STS

10

170

Low-STS

6

100

t (df =14)
p
d
Heavey
&
Hurlburtc
a

30

ISa
14.99
(15.42)
17.81
(18.37)
10.30
(7.98)
0.94
.364
0.53
26.00

IMG
20.11
(16.21)
17.67
(15.90)
24.17
(17.37)
-0.77
.457
-0.39
34.00

UNS
11.26
(10.91)
7.03
(5.38)
18.31
(14.48)
-2.26
.040
-1.03
22.00

FEEL
17.51
(15.48)
19.76
(18.13)
13.75
(10.02)
0.74
.471
0.41
26.00

NIEQ 5FP percentages
SENS
31.86
(20.44)
35.76
(22.64)
25.35
(15.79)
0.99
.341
0.53
22.00

IS
66.63
(25.60)
81.33
(9.65)
42.13
(25.42)
4.45
.001
2.04

IMG
69.03
(27.25)
72.03
(28.38)
64.04
(27.00)
0.55
.588
0.29

UNS
38.75
(25.32)
35.45
(27.16)
44.25
(23.19)
-0.66
.520
-0.35

FEEL
79.06
(19.96)
87.15
(13.24)
65.58
(23.04)
2.40
.031
1.15

SENS
68.55
(18.70)
70.63
(18.89)
65.08
(19.59)
0.56
.584
0.29

IS= Inner Speaking, IMG=Inner Seeing, UNS= Unsymbolized Thinking, FEEL=Feelings,
SENS=Sensory Awareness
b

Shaded cells repeated from Table 1

c

Values from Heavey & Hurlburt (2008)
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Figure 3: STS total score and DES inner speaking
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Figure 4: Percent NIEQ-IS and DES inner speaking
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speaking as occurring on average 81.33 percent of the time, but their DES sampling percentage
was 17.81 percent (t = 11.22, df = 8, p< .0001.) The Low-STS group retrospectively
characterized their inner speaking experience as occurring 42.13 percent of the time, but their
sampled experience was 10.30 percent (t = 9.30, df = 4, p< .0001). Even the smallest difference
(between the Low-STS groups retrospective characterization of unsymbolized thinking and DES
sampled unsymbolized thinking) was significant (18.31% for DES compared to 44.25% for the
NIEQ; t = -4.32, df = 4, p = .002). These results very strongly suggest that questionnaire methods
of studying experience may produce large overestimations.
Additionally, Table 3 (bottom row) shows that the 5FP characteristic percentages that we
found were all lower than those found by Heavey & Hurlburt (2008) with the exception of
sensory awareness. Of particular interest here, Heavey and Hurlburt found that inner speaking
occurred 26 percent of samples, whereas we found only 14.99 percent.
Table 4 shows the correlations (df = 14) between the frequency of the 5FP characteristics
as apprehended by DES sampling and the frequencies obtained from the retrospective
questionnaires used in this study. We mark with an asterisk (*) those correlations that would be
called significant (p < .05) in a hypothesis test of one correlation, using uncorrected (by
Bonferroni procedures) significances because the aim of this study is exploratory rather than
hypothesis testing. Thus these correlations should be viewed as suggesting relationships, not
confirming them.
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Table 4: Correlationsa of 5FP characteristics as apprehended by DES with retrospective
measures

STS
Total
score

DES

IS

a

NIEQ
ISb

SCL-90R

IMG

UNS

FEE
L

SEN
S

Total
score

0.18

0.03

-0.09

-0.31

-0.05

0.11

-0.10

IMG

-0.09

0.20

0.29

0.37

0.15

0.48

0.20

UNS

-0.50

-0.66

-0.06

-0.03

-0.19

-0.12

-0.13

FEEL

0.06

0.14

0.26

0.19

-0.02

0.28

0.64

SENS

0.12

0.05

0.50

-0.27

-0.08

-0.09

0.09

df = 14

b

IS= Inner Speaking, IMG=Inner Seeing, UNS= Unsymbolized Thinking, FEEL=Feelings,
SENS=Sensory Awareness
* p < .05, not corrected
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The DES sampling results are in the rows of Table 4; the questionnaire measures are in
the columns. Of particular interest here is the first row, the correlations between inner speaking
as apprehended by DES and characteristics retrospectively reported on the STS and the NIEQ-IS
scales. These correlations would be expected to be moderately high if people know the
characteristics of their own inner experience. However, Table 4 shows a low correlation (r = .18,
p = .53) between inner speaking as apprehended by DES sampling and inner speaking as
retrospectively reported on the STS. The parallel correlation between DES-apprehended inner
speaking and the NIEQ-IS scale, which defines inner speaking the same way as does DES, was
near zero (r = .03, p = .91). Continuing across the DES-IS row, we see that the only moderately
large (but still not significant) correlation is the negative relationship between sampled inner
speaking and unsymbolized thinking (r = -.31, p = .26).
An alternative way of viewing our particular interest is to focus on the NIEQ IS column,
which reports the correlations between retrospectively reported inner speech and the sampling
results. Those correlations are all very low except for the strong negative correlation with
unsymbolized thinking: those who retrospectively hold themselves to be frequent inner speakers
in fact have little unsymbolized thinking (r = -.66, p = .004).
We note in passing (not our central interest) that Table 4 shows a positive correlation
between sensory awareness as apprehended by DES and retrospective rating of inner seeing on
the NIEQ (NIEQ-IMG; r = .50, p = .048). Our participants’ retrospective belief in frequent visual
imagery was correlated with sampled visual imagery (r = .29, p = .31), but was more strongly
correlated with sensory awareness.
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We also note in passing that this study found that higher levels of feelings found in DES
sampling were associated with higher overall levels of psychological distress as reported by the
SCL-90-R (r = .64, p = .048).
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to compare retrospective self-reports of inner speaking (as
apprehended by questionnaire) to the retrospective self-reports of inner speaking and to inner
experience as apprehended by Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). Undergraduate
volunteers (N = 260) were administered three questionnaires: the Self Talk Scale (STS, a
retrospective measure of self-talk and inner speaking), the Nevada Inner Experience
Questionnaire (NIEQ, a retrospective measure of the five most frequent phenomena as
apprehended by DES, including inner speaking), and the Symptom Checklist 90 Revised (SCL90-R, a retrospective measure of overall psychological distress). Then a subset of these
volunteers (N = 16) participated in DES to investigate their inner speaking with as much fidelity
as possible.
First we ask whether the NIEQ, which was designed for this series of studies, is a valid
measure of inner speaking. The study used two retrospective questionnaire measures of inner
speaking: the two inner speaking items from the NIEQ and the full scale of the STS. We summed
the two NIEQ inner speaking items to create the NIEQ-IS, the inner speaking scale of the NIEQ,
and then investigated the relationship between the NIEQ-IS and the STS, finding a rather strong
correlation (r = .52). This is evidence establishing, in the way often used with questionnaires, the
concurrent validity of the NIEQ-IS as a measure of inner speaking. The correlation between the
NIEQ-IS and STS is not higher as there is an imperfect match between the two questionnairesthe STS asks about all self-directed speech (audible and inaudible) , while the NIEQ-IS
specifically excludes audible speech.
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However, the target of both the STS and the NIEQ-IS is an actual behavior--inner
speaking, so the study could also address the criterion validity and construct validity of both
instruments: to what extent do the STS and NIEQ-IS measure actual inner speaking and how true
are conclusions based on these instruments? To explore this, the study divided the 260
participants into quartiles based on their scores on the STS and then selected ten participants
from those scoring in the top quartile of the STS to comprise the High-STS group and six
participants from those scoring in the lower quartile to comprise the Low-STS group. Then we
sampled, using DES, all 16 participants’ real world, naturally occurring experiences. These
sampled experiences were categorized and the frequency of occurrence of the categories
compared to the STS and NIEQ ratings of experience.
The NIEQ-IS is the result of asking respondents to estimate the percentage of time they
spend engaged in inner speaking (other NIEQ items inquire about the time engaged in other
aspects of inner experience). When comparing NIEQ-IS to DES-sampled experience, the NIEQ IS grossly overestimated the frequency of DES-apprehended inner speaking. This gross
overestimation occurred in both groups. On the NIEQ-IS, the High-STS group estimated inner
speaking to occur in 81 percent of their experience, whereas DES showed that inner speaking
was present in 16 percent of their experience (an overestimate by a factor of 5). The Low-STS
group made lower NIEQ-IS retrospective estimates than did the High-STS group (42% compared
to 81%), but these estimates still were substantial overestimations (42% on the NIEQ-IS
compared to 10% from DES, an overestimate by a factor of 4). We thus conclude that the
retrospective estimates of inner speaking made on the NIEQ are not accurate characterizations of
experience.
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The correlation between questionnaire measures of inner speaking (STS and NIEQ-IS)
and inner speaking as apprehended by DES further explores the criterion validity of these
questionnaires. The correlation between the NIEQ-IS and inner speaking as apprehended by DES
is near zero all those who participated in DES (r = 0.03, df = 14); the correlation between the
STS and inner speaking as apprehended by DES is also very small (r = 0.18, df = 14).
Furthermore, these correlations were computed on participants who were selected from the upper
and lower quartiles of the STS, a procedure that would be expected to inflate the correlations—
even with this inflation, the observed correlations were close to zero. This suggests that these
questionnaires may not be a valid measure of inner speaking, but may be measuring something
else entirely. For example, there is a large and significant negative correlation between the
NIEQ-IS and unsymbolized thinking as apprehended by DES (r = -0.66). The STS also had a
negative correlation with unsymbolized thinking (r = -0.50) but it was not significant. Thus,
participants’ responses to questionnaire items about inner speaking were more strongly
associated with lack of unsymbolized thinking than directly to inner speaking.
The High-STS group did not have a significantly different percentage of DES inner
speaking than did the Low-STS group. The only significant difference between the sampled
experiences of the two groups were lower unsymbolized thinking for the High-STS group. The
STS, (which asks only about inner speaking) was a much better predictor of (lack of)
unsymbolized thinking than of inner speaking itself. This suggests that the STS may not be
measuring what its creators intended.
Taken together, these results suggest a low criterion validity for the STS and the NIEQ-IS
as measures of inner speaking. These results were aimed primarily at inner speaking. However,
because inner speaking is a relatively easy characteristic to identify and notice, and yet was
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retrospectively substantially mischaracterized, these results suggest that, in general,
questionnaires that aim to study experience retrospectively might produce results that differ in a
substantial way from actual experience. Because the STS actually is as good or better a measure
of all the features of inner experience that we measured than of the self-talk for which it was
designed, we think it reasonable to suppose, at least tentatively, that questionnaires in general
may measure something unintended due to presuppositions about the nature of experience–
participants are likely giving their impression of their experience, rather than a faithful
representation (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001). Participants are often not likely to be aware of their
own inner experience (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Hurlburt, 2011), and a questionnaire that aims at
inner experience (such as inner speaking) may simply be tapping into preconceptions. The
consistent pattern of questionnaire overestimation of DES–discovered categories of experience
for all of the 5FP may be due to the power of preconceptions. The STS and NIEQ-IS may not be
measuring any single aspect of experience at all; rather they may be measuring preconceived
notions of richness of personal experience (the High-STS group members rated themselves
higher than did the Low-STS group on all experiences except unsymbolized thinking).
There are many reasons that experiential categories might be overestimated. Here are
four: First, preexisting ideas of one’s personal characteristics (especially those deemed positive)
can strongly influence self-evaluations (Ehrlinger et al., 2008, Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003,
Crosby & Yarber, 2001). Second, neither the STS nor the NIEQ-IS specify a timeframe, asking
respondents to generalize over an unspecified time period, a procedure that invites errors of
memory. Third, it is possible that inner speaking comes to mind easily and the overestimations
are the result of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Fourth, when the
participant is asked about the characteristics of their experience, they casually ask themselves
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“what is in my experience now?” (that is, they engage in “armchair introspection”; Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2011). Answering a self-imposed verbal question may result in inner speaking.
These factors suggest that conclusions about inner speaking (and experience in general) based on
questionnaires are unlikely to be correct, and imply low construct validity.
Throughout this paper, we have used DES as the criterion measure of experience. That
use has limitations. As a tool to explore inner experience, DES mitigates many of the weaknesses
inherent in questionnaire methods. DES takes pains to ensure that the investigators and
participants share a vocabulary when speaking about experience, and its co-investigator
relationship with the participants makes it more likely that these sorts of misunderstandings are
detected and discussed. The focus on specific moments of experience greatly reduces the
likelihood of participants’ memory errors. DES actively searches for and brackets (holds aside,
puts out of commission) preconceived notions of experience (from both the participant and
investigator) increasing the likelihood that a description may be faithful to the experience, not
simply an impression of or theory about oneself. Not assuming the participant has the perfect
ability to apprehend his own experience and allowing him to practice through several iterations
of the method additionally increases the ability of DES apprehend and study inner experience.
Although it is not a perfect solution for these problems, DES makes faithful descriptions of
experience more likely. However, taking such pains in no way guarantees that DES in general
produces faithful descriptions, nor that our application of DES was adequate.
Although the small sample size (N = 16) of this study warrants caution in any
interpretation, there were some differences in the relationship between inner experience and the
SCL-90-R in our STS screened sample, and Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study which used a
sample stratified by SCL-90-R Scores (N = 30). This study found a strong correlation between
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feelings and psychological distress (r = .64) whereas Heavey and Hurlburt found a much smaller
(though still positive) correlation (r = .18). This study found almost no correlation (r = -0.10)
between inner speaking and psychological distress whereas Heavey and Hurlburt found a
relationship between inner speaking and psychological distress such that higher levels of inner
speaking were associated with lower levels of psychological distress (r = -.36). Additional
research is needed to draw any definitive conclusions in the relationship between inner speaking
and psychological distress.
Questionnaires are used ubiquitously through most of the study of psychology and it is
easy to understand their popularity: they are inexpensive, relatively quick, easy to administer in
large numbers, and produce data that can be easily analyzed statistically. However this study
suggests caution in using such instruments to infer the characteristics of inner experience.
Although this study looked primarily at inner speaking, it seems probable that the inaccuracies
and difficulties we found may have their counterparts in other kinds of experience. Future studies
comparing other questionnaires that are aimed at apprehending experience would increase
understanding of the relationship between retrospective ratings and actual experience.
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